When people are asked to give the first digit that comes to mind (Kubovy & Psotka, 1976) , the modal choice is 7 (28.4%), which is more than twice as frequent as the second ranking choice, 3 (13.3%).
In requesting "the first digit that comes to mind," the experimenter is essentially asking for a spontaneous response. In order to comply, a person must either respond spontaneously or give the impression of having done so. When the request is made unexpectedly, as it usually is, it is difficult to respond spontaneously. Since it is unlikely that a response is available in short-term memory, any response will have to be retrieved from long-term memory; so the respondent would presumably feel its lack of spontaneity. Under such circumstances, we might expect the respondent to choose a response that gives the impression of having been emitted spontaneously, that is, a response that seems to have arisen "entirely from natural impulse, without any external stimulus or constraint" (italics mine; Oxford University, 1959, under spontaneous) . The most appropriate heuristic rule for choosing such a response would be to choose the response which is the least related to external stimuli or constraints. Kubovy and Psotka (1976) present evidence showing that the digit 7 predominates because it is more representative of spontaneous acts than any of the other possible responses. This apparent spontaneity heuristic resembles the representativeness heuristic Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described for responding to probabilistic questions. Both heuristics use a judgment of resemblance in order to generate a response to a question or a request for which an algorithmic answer or procedure is unknown or unavailable.
The parallel between these two heuristics suggests the possibility that the second heuristic Tversky and Kahneman (1974) proposed, availability, may also have an analogue in responses to requests for spontaneous behavior. Specifically, if a 359 response is primed, that is, made available in short-term memory, and if the respondent tries in good faith to comply with the request, then the primed response should be emitted (since it is presumably the first to come to mind).
Experiment 1
In an attempt to maximize the chances of observing a priming effect, a priming word was introduced as unobtrusively as possible into the experimenters' requests for a spontaneous response.
Method
Four students 1 from my Yale College introductory statistics section stopped 390 people on the Yale campus and said, "Give me the first one-digit number that comes to mind."
Results and Discussion
Because the data came from different experimenters and different groups of respondents (technically, unequal clusters of observations), statistical tests for this experiment and Experiments 2 and 3 were done as follows. The standard error of the percentage choices can be computed by two methods: assuming random unequal cluster sampling (Kish, 1965, pp. 187-188) and assuming one simple random sample
of the same number of people as the total of all the clusters. The ratio of these estimates of the standard error is called the square-root design effect (Vdeff). Throughout this study, the standard error was computed assuming a simple random sample; this standard error was multiplied by 1.93, the largest Vdeff found in this series of experiments. Thus, the standard errors employed were never smaller than those based on the assumption of random unequal cluster sampling and were almost certainly overestimates. Data are reported in the form r ± se(r)%, in which r is the estimated percentage of choice and se(r) is its standard error, computed as described above.
The choice frequency distribution is shown in Figure 1 . The difference between the pattern of choices in response to the present request and the baseline pattern based on 1,770 responses that Kubovy and Psotka (1976) reported, also plotted in Figure 1 , is striking. The frequency of 1 is much higher in the present data (17.95% ± 3.76%) than in the baseline data (2.20% ± .68%), a highly significant difference (z -4.12,p < .0001), whereas the frequency of 7 is dramatically reduced in these data (12.05% ± 3.19%) from its modal position in the earlier data (28.36% ± 2.07%), also a highly significant difference (z = 4.29, p < .0001). It is interesting to note what appears to be an almost perfect trade-off between 1 and 7 in these two sets of data: What 1 gained in the present experiment (15.75%) is balanced by what 7 lost (16.31%). Thus, the hypothesis that availability can affect the choice frequency distribution is confirmed.
There is one additional difference: The frequency of 8 in the present experiment (4.87% ± 2.11%) and the baseline (12.09% ± 1.50%) differ significantly (z = 2.79, p < .005), but the difference is less than half the size of the change in the frequencies of 1 and 7. I do not understand this difference. 
Experiment 2
If there are two heuristics for the performance of this task, representativeness of spontaneity and response availability, it is important to elucidate the relationship between them. We have seen in the preceding experiment that if one response is more available than others, respondents do not use the representativeness heuristic. The request in the preceding experiment, however, did not pit the availability heuristic against the representativeness heuristic: There was nothing in the situation that made the digit 1 appear caused or constrained by an external stimulus. Furthermore, Kubovy and Psotka (1976, Experiment 3) have shown that the availability heuristic does not operate in a context in which the most available response is made to appear externally caused or constrained. Specifically, the frequency of 7 dropped precipitously (relative to the baseline) when the subjects were asked to write down "the first number that comes to mind between 0 and 9, avoiding fractions, and using only whole numbers like 7." There is reason to suspect, therefore, that when the availability heuristic is allowed to operate, its output is tested for apparent spontaneity. If the available response appears externally caused or constrained it is rejected, and the apparent spontaneity heuristic is employed. It follows that if we replicate Experiment 3 of Kubovy and Psotka (1976) except that we prime 1 instead of 7, we should not observe a priming effect, but only the effect of the apparent spontaneity heuristic.
Method
The experiment was conducted on 184 undergraduates in three Yale College psychology classes (consisting of 129, 15, and 39 students, respectively). The students were asked to write down "the first number that comes to mind between 0 and 9, excluding fractions, and using only whole numbers like 1."
Results and Discussion
The choice frequency distribution is shown in Figure 2 this distribution and the Kubovy and Psotka (1976) baseline data is remarkable. Although the null hypothesis that the distributions differ is just barely rejected, X 2 (9) = 16.88, p = .05, rank correlations between the frequencies are very high: p = .80 (Spearman) or r = .90 (Kendall). Thus, although the digit 1 is mentioned in the instructions for the present experiment, there is very little difference between the distribution of responses to the present request (in particular, 1 is chosen by 5.43% ± 3.23% of the respondents) and the baseline data (when 1 was chosen by 2.20% ± .58% of the respondents).
This confirms the hypothesis that mere mention of a digit is not sufficient to increase its selection. If it is quite obviously on the experimenter's mind, since he or she gave it as an example, then it cannot possibly serve as a spontaneous response. Furthermore, when the primed response is rejected for this reason, the representativeness heuristic is employed to generate an apparently spontaneous response other than the primed response.
Experiment 3
In an experiment resembling Experiment 1, Hsu (1948) asked 1,044 people to "write a 4-digit number that must be original, i.e., created in your mind; and it must not represent an event, a fact or a datum, such as a telephone number, a house number, etc" (p. 59). Hsu reported that 4 was the modal initial digit, chosen by 15.5% of the respondents. The present experiment is an attempt to replicate Hsii's experiment and to show that the prominence of 4 is due to priming.
Method
There were two conditions in the experiment. The participants in Condition 1 were 190 undergraduates from four Yale College psychology classes (consisting of 43, 46, 88, and 13 students, respectively).
3 The students were asked to write down "the first fourdigit number that comes to mind."
The participants in Condition 2 were 116 undergraduates from four Yale College psychology classes (consisting of 24, 19, 37, and 36 students, respectively). 4 The students were asked to write down "the first number between 1,000 and 9,999 that comes to mind."
Results and Discussion
The choice frequency distributions of the initial digit of numbers obtained in the two conditions are compared in Figure 3 . The digit 4 is much more frequent in Condition 1 (27.37% ± 6.26%) than in Condition 2 (4.31% ± 3.65%), a highly significant difference (z = 3.19, p < .001), whereas the digit 1 is much less frequent in Condition 1 (24.21% ± 6.01%) than in Condition 2 (51.72% ± 8.99%), also a highly significant difference (z = 2.54, p < .01).
Just as in Experiment 1 there was an apparent trade-off between 1 and 7, here there appears to be a trade-off between 1 and 4: 4 gained in Condition 1 (23.06%) almost all that 1 lost in Condition 2 (27.51%).
No further significant differences were found in pair-wise comparisons of individual digits (assuming standard errors corrected by the Vdeff), although a test of independence applied to all digits except 1 and 4 did reveal a significant lack of independence, * 2 (6) = 17.31, p = .0082. The magnitude of the differences revealed by this test are no more than a third as big as the differences of interest discussed in the preceding paragraph: Specifically, 5 was chosen by 2.63% ± 2.25% of the respondents in Condition 1 and by 10.34% ± 5.48% of the respondents in Condition 2, a difference of only 7.71%.
The comparison of the two conditions of this experiment provides further support for the idea that response availability can affect subjects' responses in this task. When there was no priming, the modal initial digit was 1. It is not clear why 1 was chosen rather than 7. Perhaps 7 is chosen when the relationships among digits are obvious, that is, when the set of response alternatives is small (e.g., 0-9 or 20-29 as in Kubovy & Psotka, 1976 , Experiments 1 and 4). It is also possible that mentioning 1,000 primes the response 1 in a manner similar to priming effects demonstrated in the first two experiments. 
General Discussion
I can now propose a tentative description of the choice process underlying the response to the type of simple questions under study. Figure 4 shows a flow diagram corresponding to this process. After hearing the question, the respondent must interpret what he or she is being asked to do. It is reasonable to assume that not all people interpret the question as being a request for a spontaneous response or have a conception of what response might appear spontaneous. If the trade-offs observed in Experiments 1 and 3 are a measure of the percentage of people in the population studied who are sensitive to the apparent spontaneity of their responses in this situation, then one could estimate that it lies somewhere between 16% (1 gained 15.75% and 7 lost 16.31%, Experiment 1) and 25% (4 gained 23.06% and 1 lost 27.51%, Experiment 3).
Consider the respondents who are sensitive to apparent spontaneity. They try to comply with the request for a spontaneous response, as shown by the effectiveness of the priming operation (Experiments 1 and 3), in the absence of an apparent external cause or constraint on the response. The priming operation works when the priming stimulus is embedded in the experimenter's request ("one-digit number" in Experiment 1 or "four-digit number" in Experiment 3), that is, when the priming word is used 6 by the experimenter. The respondent can comply with the request in good faith because the priming word is in short-term memory. When the priming word is mentioned by the experimenter ("like 7" in Kubovy & Psotka, 1976, Experiment 3, and "like 7" in the present Experiment 2), that is, when he or she uses the name of the word, the response is rejected even though it is in short-term memory because the experimenter would appear to have caused the response.
If no priming stimulus is given, no response is found in short-term memory; and the respondent must have recourse to the apparent spontaneity heuristic. Kubovy and Psotka (1976) that this heuristic is extremely sensitive to the response set. For instance, 7 is the modal response for the sets 0-9 and 20-29, but not for the sets 6-15 or 70-79. In the present study we have seen that 1 is the modal initial digit for the set 1,000 to 9,999. Some of these preferences, but not all, are easy to understand. For instance, 77 is avoided because its repetitiousness would make it appear less spontaneous than 73, which is in fact the modal choice.
It may seem strange at first blush that it is necessary to invoke all this mental apparatus in order to understand the response to such a simple and playful request, but such apparatus would seem to be required for the generation of speech. Hockett (1967 Hockett ( /1973 argues that "all speech... can be and must be accounted for essentially in terms of ... three mechanisms: analogy, blending, and editing." We need not concern ourselves here with analogy and blending, but editing is indeed 6 The words use and mention are employed here in the technical sense that Quine (19S9, illustrated: "When we write:
The fifth word of "The Raven" rhymes with the eleventh. We mention the words 'dreary' and 'weary,' but what we use are names of them. We write 'rhymes with' not between the rhyming words but between their names," For further clarification, see Suppes (1957, pp. 121-122 Laver, 1969 Laver, /1973 , for a similar view). A complete discussion of the norms reflected in covert editing is beyond the scope of this article; it is certain, however, that they include norms of impression management (Goffman, 1959) , which enable us to seem spontaneous when we are not.
